Battle of Khaz Oruzgan

Battle of Khaz Oruzgan
Part of War in Afghanistan (2001–present)
Date 2 September 2008
Location Khaz Oruzgan, northern Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan
Result Coalition defeat
Belligerents
 Australia
 United States
Taliban insurgency
Commanders and leaders
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Strength
Five armoured Humvees
Combined patrol consisted of 37 soldiers
Between 100-200 Taliban fighters
Casualties and losses
1 American killed and 1 wounded
9 Australians wounded
Between 20-80 (estimated)
None

The Battle of Khaz Oruzgan (2 September 2008) occurred when a combined Australian, American, and Afghan patrol was ambushed by up to 200 Taliban fighters near the village of Khaz Oruzgan. The infamous battle was one of the most intense for Australian forces since the Vietnam war at the time.

Contents

Background

In late August at the American FOB Anaconda, a combined operation of Australians and Americans began the first patrol to "flush out the bad guys". The Australians managed to spot a party of three Taliban who were possibly organising fighters to hit the Americans who were some distance away. After the Taliban crossed the 'killing ground' where there would be no real cover for them to hide behind, the Australian snipers proceeded to engage and neutralise all three targets.

American intelligence soon revealed further Taliban were coming in order to collect the dead. The Americans then changed their positions so they could observe up the valley. Right after the Taliban had stopped their vehicle, the Americans sent a volley of 40 mm grenades destroying the vehicle and its six occupants. It was later revealed that one of the Taliban inside was the eastern commander of the Taliban in that area.

The ANA soldiers then proceeded to pilfer their AKs, ammunition and their webbing, and anything else of importance. An American medic treated one of the wounded Taliban and was soon released after questioning. They thought it was best to let him go to see what would develop from the ccoalition ambush.

On the return to Anaconda, the patrol was ambushed by a handful of fighters with small enemy fire. The patrol was broadside onto the enemy and the green zone, and to the right was a large steep feature. With only one way to go the patrol turned all guns towards the enemy fire and threw everything they had. Eventually, the American JTAC called in two F/A-18 Hornets and provided two 30mm canon runs into Taliban positions. On the first patrol a total of 11 had been killed that day.

After an overnight rest, they began to gear up for the next operation the following day. Little did they know that it would turn into one of the biggest battles involving Australian troops since Vietnam.

Battle

Two days following the first engagement, the combined patrol was back out. The Australian patrol plus one other drove out with the American and ANA during daylight. The vehicle patrol consisted of five armoured Humvees-three manned by Americans and two by the ANA- with a total of 37 altogether. The patrol carried all the same weapons they had used a couple of days before, the .338 sniper rifle and 7.62mm SR25 rifles. As the convoy moved out of base Anaconda it passed through a village and drove up the valley it had traversed on the earlier operation. They were routinely receiving chatter via a captured radio which was then being deciphered by an Afghan interpreter to inform the coalition what the enemy were planning.

As they came into the next valley the chatter became more excitable with 12 local men in the green rolling along and observing the patrol. At the end of the valley the Americans dropped off the Australians who were to occupy a couple of overwatch locations at either end of a high feature. In other words, they were the bait to stir things up. From the high ground they observed a fair amount of activity within the village. One of the other patrols that had been inserted that night saw seven fighters trying to get into position to hit the Americans, so they engaged and neutralised them at close range. By now, the Americans had driven around the feature occupied by the Australians and positioned themselves right on the edge of the village. This action did not stir up much activity within Khaz Oruzgan.

After that part of the operation, the Australian patrol walked down and met up with the Americans who had driven back to pick them up. An Afghan interpreter had picked up a lot of intelligence suggesting the joint patrol could be ambushed on the way out. Many in the patrol had become quite complacent due to the previous failed Taliban actions and the ineffective ambush organised against them two days previously.

It was mid-afternoon, and one of the PCs contacted the troop boss and told him for the patrol to find a safe position for now and move late at night. This was good planning however the Americans objected, by saying they wanted to move out right away. The troop boss then spoke to the American commander by saying,"Think seriously about staying in location as we can have a look around at night through predator to pick up any activity." But the Americans would not agree; they wanted to get back, so the joint patrol began driving into the valley.

Waiting for them were between 100-200 Taliban fighters, all armed and determined to wipe them out. After driving for 20 minutes, an ANA interpreter started to transfer the chatter he was picking up. "They're coming towards the first ambush point". At one stage he reported they said, "Don't shoot yet, wait till they get past the house".

Almost immediately they sprung the ambush with machine guns and mortars coming from the green to their left about 300 metres away. The first volley was off target and no-one was hit. The Americans stopped the vehicles and put down a heavy weight of return fire but to no great effect. The bullets and mortars kept coming, heavy at first but became more sporadic. Suddenly, the Taliban began to engage the Humvees from behind. The Taliban leader had also just said over the radio,"Kill them, kill them all".

The patrol was approximately 80 metres (87 yd) from the road to avoid IEDs, in front of them was a steep sided creek line about 10 metres deep, ran from the road getting more severe the closer it got to the high feature to their right. Unable to cross it, it left them no choice but to lead down towards the road and even closer to the green where most of the fire was coming from. The Americans didn't seem to know what to do so the Australians made some harsh suggestions about what they could do to get out and started to pepper-pot forward.

Suddenly, the patrol came under another heavy weight of fire. As they struggled to deal with the fighters in the green zone and from behind, they then engaged the convoy from the high ground. The valley was roughly 3.5 kilometres (2.2 mi) long and the patrol was only right at the start of it when the ambush began. They were unable to turn back because the Taliban had dug in behind so they only way out was to press forward. The single shots coming from the high ground were becoming more accurate with some of the soldiers starting to get hit. One of the Americans operating the turrets was wounded and was replaced by an Australian.

The convoy began to move through the rough terrain, however, they were now being hit from three sides. As the patrol went past and left their field of fire the Taliban would leapfrog each other, getting in front of them and setting up another position. It was at this time, the patrol JTAC, saw an Australian CH-47 Chinook flying into the American FOB flanked by two Dutch AH-64 Apache gunships which had hellfire rockets and 30 mm chain guns. They could be very effective so SG contacted them by radio and called for assistance. Eventually, the Apaches came over and circled high above the battleground. SG told them to neutralise the threat on the highground, then to switch their attention to the green. SG gave them multiple target indications, but then, unbelievably, the Dutch refused to drop down to a firing level. The Dutch refused to drop below an altitude of 15,000 feet (4,600 m) for fear they might draw fire onto themselves, despite Apaches being heavily armoured.

The patrol was continually coming under heavy fire and beginning to take more casualties. Several soldiers deliberately exposed themselves in order to draw attention away from the casualties, allowing them to be moved to cover. The casualties soon took up all the space within the vehicles. Leaving those who had not been wounded having to run beside the vehicles whilst under fire.

During the conduct of the convoy manoeuvre, a severely wounded Afghan interpreter was left behind. Of his own volition and complete disregard for his own safety, an Australian trooper named Mark Donaldson moved alone, on foot, across 80 metres (87 yd) of exposed ground to recover the wounded interpreter. His movement quickly drew intense and accurate machine gun fire from entrenched positions. Upon reaching the wounded Afghan, Donaldson picked him up and carried him back to the relative safety of the convoy where he provided immediate first aid before returning to the fight. Eventually the convoy was able to establish a clean break and move to an area free of enemy fire.[1][2]

Aftermath

Outcome

The battle lasted over two hours before the convoy managed to break off the action and return to the American FOB, Anaconda. They also suffered heavy casualties before managing to withdraw. The infamous battle is described as a coalition defeat

Dutch controversy

An ADF report says Australian SAS and US forces were abandoned by Dutch allies during the battle in Afghanistan. A former Australian SAS sniper named Rob Maylor, wounded during the battle, said the Australians had pleaded with the Dutch saying: "We're in an absolute doozy of a shitfight. We need your assistance as we're taking casualties".

But the Dutch helicopter pilots refused to offer covering for the Australian, US and Afghan troops in the ambush. The role of the Dutch in the battle was described by Maylor in his book SAS Sniper. He writes that during the battle the Australians saw two Dutch Apache helicopters escorting a Chinook and radioed the pilots to fire their Hellfire laser-guided missiles and 30 mm cannons on the Taliban. But the Dutch pilots refused to drop below 5,000 metres (16,000 ft), despite the Apaches being capable of operating at low levels under heavy fire.

"They wouldn't open up on the Taliban for fear they might draw some fire themselves," Maylor said. In the end the soldier on the ground responsible for guiding air support told the Dutch: "If you're not going to engage then you might as well fuck off." And they did, Maylor writes. Maylor's wounds from the battle were patched up by Donaldson, who was later awarded a VC for gallantry for rescuing a wounded interpreter that day.[3]

Mark Donaldson VC recipient

Corporal Mark Gregor Strang Donaldson enlisted into the Australian Army on 18 June 2002. After completing Recruit and Initial and Employment Training he was posted to the 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment. Having successfully completed the Special Air Service Selection Course in April 2004, Corporal Donaldson was posted to Special Air Service Regiment in May 2004.

On 2 September 2008, during the conduct of a fighting patrol, Corporal (then Trooper) Donaldson was travelling in a combined Afghan, US and Australian vehicle convoy that was engaged by a numerically superior, entrenched and coordinated enemy ambush. The ambush was initiated by a high volume of sustained machine gun fire coupled with the effective use of rocket propelled grenades. Such was the effect of the initiation that the combined patrol suffered numerous casualties, completely lost the initiative and became immediately suppressed. It was over two hours before the convoy was able to establish a clean break and move to an area free of enemy fire.

In the early stages of the ambush, Corporal Donaldson reacted spontaneously to regain the initiative. He moved rapidly between alternate positions of cover engaging the enemy with 66 mm and 84 mm anti-armour weapons as well as his M4 rifle. During an early stage of the enemy ambush, he deliberately exposed himself to enemy fire in order to draw attention to himself and thus away from wounded soldiers. This selfless act alone bought enough time for those wounded to be moved to relative safety.

As the enemy had employed the tactic of a rolling ambush, the patrol was forced to conduct numerous vehicle manoeuvres, under intense enemy fire, over a distance of approximately four kilometres to extract the convoy from the engagement area. Compounding the extraction was the fact that casualties had consumed all available space within the vehicles. Those who had not been wounded, including Corporal Donaldson, were left with no option but to run beside the vehicles throughout. During the conduct of this vehicle manoeuvre to extract the convoy from the engagement area, a severely wounded coalition force interpreter was inadvertently left behind. Of his own volition and displaying complete disregard for his own safety, Corporal Donaldson moved alone, on foot, across approximately 80 metres of exposed ground to recover the wounded interpreter. His movement, once identified by the enemy, drew intense and accurate machine gun fire from entrenched positions. Upon reaching the wounded coalition force interpreter, Corporal Donaldson picked him up and carried him back to the relative safety of the vehicles then provided immediate first aid before returning to the fight. On subsequent occasions during the battle, Corporal Donaldson administered medical care to other wounded soldiers, whilst continually engaging the enemy.

Corporal Donaldson's acts of exceptional gallantry in the face of accurate and sustained enemy fire ultimately saved the life of a coalition force interpreter and ensured the safety of the other members of the combined Afghan, US and Australian force. Corporal Donaldson's actions on this day displayed exceptional courage in circumstances of great peril. His actions are of the highest accord and are in keeping with the finest traditions of the Special Operations Command, the Australian Army and the Australian Defence Force.[4]

Sarbi

Sarbi is an Australian special forces explosives detection dog that spent almost 14 months missing in action (MIA) in Afghanistan after disappearing during the Battle of Khaz Oruzgan in September 2008. It is thought that a rocket explosion had scared her off after her leash was broken. She was rediscovered alive in late 2009 when an American soldier noticed Sarbi accompanying a local man. She was later flown back to the Australian base in Tarin Kowt where they confirmed it was indeed Sarbi. Her rediscovery generated world-wide news and was mentioned by Kevin Rudd, and General Stanley McChrystal.

On 5 April 2011 Sarbi was awarded an RSPCA Purple Cross Award at the Australian War Memorial. The RSPCA Australia Purple Cross Award recognises the deeds of animals that have shown outstanding service to humans, particularly if they showed exceptional courage in risking their own safety or life to save a person from injury or death.[5]

References